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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, cryptocurrencies have been the topic of discussion everywhere 
from boardrooms to celebrities’ social media accounts. They are a new form 
of investing that seems to make money magically appear, but is it too good to 
be true? Global regulators are unsure of how these new cryptocurrencies 
should be treated.1 The United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) has taken a position on the matter and declared that some of these in-
vestments are considered “securities” under U.S. law, meaning they are sub-
ject to the vigorous securities regulation regime.2 Declaring these investments 
securities adds a layer of protection to investors who might fall victim of fraud 
resulting from cryptocurrencies.3 
The United States is not the only country that has taken notice of the po-
tential need for regulation in the cryptocurrency markets. Regulators in Asia 
have also responded to the growing cryptocurrency market.4 China has banned 
initial coin offerings (ICOs), discussed below, and closed cryptocurrency ex-
changes over concerns of fraud.5 South Korean regulators have begun inves-
tigating cryptocurrency-related compliance in large banks and have also pro-
hibited ICOs.6 Australian legislators are considering legislation which would 
put regulation of cryptocurrencies within the reach of AUSTRAC, Australia’s 
financial intelligence agency.7 
Regulatory bodies across the globe have not been uniform in responding 
to cryptocurrencies.8 How can investors have any confidence in the market 
with so much uncertainty? Opening U.S. tribunals, and thus its securities 
 
 1 See LAW LIBRARY OF CONG., REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY AROUND THE WORLD 
(2018) (demonstrating the differences between cryptocurrency regulations over the world). 
 2 See Kate Rooney, SEC Chief Says Agency Won’t Change Securities Laws to Cater to 
Cryptocurrencies, CNBC (June 11, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/06/sec-chairma 
n-clayton-says-agency-wont-change-definition-of-a-security.html (reporting that SEC 
chairman Jay Clayton said that the SEC will not change the definition of a security to cater 
to the new cryptocurrency markets and under the current definition of a security, tokens 
used in an initial coin offering are securities). 
 3 See What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/A 
rticle/whatwedo.html (explaining how SEC regulations help investors as part of their tri-
fold mission of “protect[ing] investors, maintain[ing] fair, orderly and efficient markets, 
and facilitate[ing] capital formation”). 
 4 See Carlos M. Gutierrez, Jr., Asia Takes the Lead in Regulating Cryptocurrency Mar-
kets, ASIA TIMES (Jan. 10, 2018), http://www.atimes.com/asia-leads-way-cryptocurrency-r 
egulation/. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 See generally REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 1 
(showing how different regions are regulating the cryptocurrency markets completely dif-
ferently). 
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antifraud regime, to investors who have been harmed in fraudulent cryptocur-
rency transactions may increase investor confidence and potentially foster 
capital markets.9 There are two ways that the United States deters fraudulent 
securities transactions.10 First, our securities regulation regime allows the SEC 
to bring enforcement action and, second, for individuals to bring private rights 
of action.11 
This Note aims to evaluate how the doctrine of extraterritoriality applies 
to securities regulation in the cryptocurrency market. Specifically, this Note 
will examine how the extraterritorial application of Rule 10b-5 applies to the 
emerging cryptocurrency market for both SEC enforcement actions and pri-
vate rights of actions. Part I will provide some background information about 
what a cryptocurrency is and how Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) work. Part II 
will discuss how the U.S. defines a security that falls within our regulation 
regime, how some Initial Coin Offerings fall within the purview of our secu-
rities regime, and how the SEC has responded to Initial Coin Offerings. Part 
III will discuss the current state of the law of extraterritorial application of 
securities regulation, both for SEC enforcement actions and private actions. 
Finally, Part IV will provide some analysis about the future of private 10b-5 




To begin the inquiry into the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities 
law in the context of cryptocurrency markets, the first step is understanding 
what cryptocurrencies are. Both cryptocurrency and traditional forms of cur-
rency are only as valuable as society believes they are. Traditional currencies’ 
bills and coins are just tokens we use to exchange goods and services based 
on how valuable we believe it is.12 Cash has no inherent value; it is a piece of 
paper.13 As technology has developed over the years, there is no longer a need 
for currency to take the form of a physical token, like cash.14 Transactions 
began moving away from a physical token of currency long before 
 
 9 STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 
9 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 4th ed. 2015) (noting that U.S. securities laws foster trans-
parency and accuracy which is helpful to the capital markets). 
 10 See generally Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud De-
terrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 2173 (2010). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Martin Tillier, What is a Cryptocurrency?, NASDAQ (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.na 
sdaq.com/article/what-is-a-cryptocurrency-cm910816. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
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cryptocurrencies were even an idea.15 This is illustrated by the development 
of written checks and eventually debit cards.16 No cash ever changes hands in 
transactions involving these methods.17 The bank simply reduces your balance 
and increases someone else’s by updating a ledger. 18 
Cryptocurrencies are somewhat similar to the idea of debit cards and writ-
ten checks, but there are some key differences.19 First, they are not backed by 
a government.20 Instead, cryptocurrencies are created and controlled by algo-
rithms.21 The algorithms determine how transactions are made and recorded 
and how new cryptocurrencies are released.22 Instead of completing transac-
tions through banks or another intermediary, cryptocurrency users and their 
recorded transactions create a system known as the blockchain.23 This block-
chain system of “peer-to-peer” transactions instead of government issued cur-
rencies is the first major distinction between traditional currencies and cryp-
tocurrencies.24 
The second difference is that the total amount of a cryptocurrency in cir-
culation is limited.25 This differs from traditional currency because govern-
ments can, and do, simply print more money to increase the amount in circu-
lation.26 As economies grow, governments create more currency to allow for 
the growth.27 Adding more currency into the circulation of that currency is 
what causes inflation.28 Because of this, traditional currencies are based on an 
inflationary model.29 Cryptocurrencies, on the other hand, are exactly the op-
posite because they operate on a deflationary model.30 The total supply of a 
cryptocurrency in circulation is restricted.31 As the economy grows, instead 
of adding more cryptocurrency into circulation, each unit of cryptocurrency 
has more buying power than it previously had.32 For example, something that 
 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
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costs one unit of cryptocurrency today will cost a fraction of the same unit as 
time passes and the economy grows.33 
 
B. Initial Coin Offerings 
 
On its face, the concept of cryptocurrency might seem to be outside of the 
SEC’s scope of enforcement. However, the concept of initial coin offerings 
(ICOs) makes it clear that cryptocurrencies are within the SEC’s scope of 
power. Promoters have been selling virtual tokens, a unit of cryptocurrency, 
in ICOs.34 Those who wish to purchase the virtual tokens through an ICO can 
use traditional currency to make their purchase.35 Sometimes these promoters 
lead purchasers to believe that they will receive a return on their investment.36 
Sometimes those in need of capital (i.e. start-ups or online projects) use ICOs 
as a way to raise capital without going through the hassle of issuing stock or 
finding venture capitalists to invest.37 In this regard, ICOs are similar to 
crowdfunding,38 which is regulated by the SEC.39 
 
C. The Howey Test 
 
The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) defines what a security is.40 
That definition includes a catchall provision listing “investment contracts” as 
a security falling within the purview of the Securities Act and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).41 In 1946, the Supreme Court gave 
guidance on what the broad sweeping “investment contract” means.42 An in-
vestment contract, and thus a security within the reach of the SEC’s 
 
 33 Id. 
 34 Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_coinofferings. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Nathaniel Popper, An Explanation of Initial Coin Offerings, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/technology/what-is-an-initial-coin-offering. 
html. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See generally Regulation Crowdfunding, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.se 
c.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings/regcrowdfunding. 
 40 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §77b(a)(1) (2012) (defining the term “security” 
for purposes of the Act). 
 41 Id.; see also CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 9, at 97 (explaining that the reason the 
inclusion of “investment contracts” in the definition of a security makes the SEC’s power 
broad by leaving the definition of investment contract up for interpretation). 
 42 See generally SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
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regulation, is any instrument that meets the requirements of the Howey test.43 
The Howey test was established in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.44 The defendants 
in that case were two Florida corporations under the same control and man-
agement.45 The company owned large tracts of citrus farms in Florida. Lead-
ing up to the case, the company would offer up half of its acreage to the public 
to “help [them] finance additional development.”46 
Each prospective customer was offered both a land sale and service con-
tract.47 The land sale contract allowed the purchasers to get a portion of the 
acreage of the citrus farm.48 The service contract allowed Howey’s other com-
pany, one under the same management and control, to cultivate the land, mak-
ing it profitable for the purchaser.49 Additionally, the company told potential 
buyers that it was not feasible to invest in a land contract unless they also 
purchase the service contract.50 The service contract gave the cultivating com-
pany a leasehold interest in the purchased land and “full and complete” pos-
session for ten years with no cancellation option.51 
The purchasers were mostly out-of-state residents and professionals with 
no knowledge or skills necessary to cultivate a citrus farm.52 The court spec-
ulated that purchasers were attracted by the arrangement because of the ex-
pectation of profits, not because they were interested in cultivating citrus 
trees.53 Were the Securities Act and the Exchange Act intended to regulate 
these kinds of investing instruments? The court took the opportunity to not 
only decide this case, but to create a test for future inquiries into defining in-
vestment contracts.54 
The court concluded in Howey that the sales and service contracts taken 
together constituted an investment contract.55 Thus, the investors in the citrus 
farm could turn to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act for protection.56 
The court looked to the Congressional intent of defining securities and noted 
that 
 
 43 Id. at 297 (stating that an affirmative answer to whether the contract was an investment 
contract brings into operation the registration requirement of the Act). 
 44 Id. at 301 (“[t]he test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a 
common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.”). 
 45 Id. at 294–95. 
 46 Id. at 295. 
 47 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 294 (1946). 
 48 Id. at 295. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 296–97 (1946). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 301 (establishing a test that is still used today). 
 55 Id. at 299. 
 56 Id. at 300. 
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[t]he term “investment contract” is undefined by the Securities 
Act or by relevant legislative reports. But, the term was com-
mon in many state “blue sky” laws in existence prior to the 
adoption of the federal statute and, although the term was also 
undefined by those state laws, it had been broadly construed 
by state courts so as to afford the investing public a full meas-
ure of protection. Form was disregarded for substance and em-
phasis was placed upon economic reality. An investment con-
tract thus came to mean a contract or scheme for “the placing 
of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure 
income or profit from its employment.” This definition was 
uniformly applied by state courts to a variety of situa-
tions where individuals were led to invest money in a common 
enterprise with the expectation that they would earn a profit 
solely through the efforts of the promoter or of some one other 
than themselves.57 
By including “investment contract,” a concept that had been utilized by 
states before federal regulation of securities, in the definition of a security, the 
court held that Congress intended to use the same “investment contract” that 
had been “crystallized by [its] prior judicial interpretation.”58 Thus, 
an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act 
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person in-
vests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect 
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, 
it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are ev-
idenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the 
physical assets employed in the enterprise.59 
 
D. Howey Test and Cryptocurrencies—The DAO Report 
 
The recent buzz over cryptocurrencies led SEC chairman Jay Clayton to 
make a public statement regarding cryptocurrencies and ICOs.60 Prior to the 
statement, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement had investigated a 
 
 57 Id. at 298 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 58 SEC. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). 
 59 Id. at 298–99. 
 60 See Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. 
& EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017) https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement- 
clayton-2017-12-11 (“The world’s social media platforms and financial markets are abuzz 
about cryptocurrencies and [ICOs].”). 
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Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO).61 The SEC’s investigation 
had to answer a threshold question to determine the application of U.S. secu-
rities laws to the offer and sale of DAO Tokens: Are DAO Tokens securi-
ties?62 The SEC determined the DAO Tokens were securities.63 The report 
that followed the DAO investigation (DAO Report) “reiterate[d the] funda-
mental principles of the U.S. federal securities laws and describe[d] their ap-
plicability to a new paradigm—virtual organizations or capital raising entities 
that use distributed ledger or blockchain technology to facilitate capital raising 
and/or investment and the related offer and sale of securities.”64 In the DAO 
Report, the SEC used the Howey test to determine whether these new form of 
investment instruments were securities within the reach of U.S. securities 
laws.65 
The first element of the Howey test is whether investors invested money.66 
The SEC determined that this element was satisfied in the DAO.67 Investors 
in the DAO used Ethereum (ETH), a cryptocurrency, to purchase the DAO 
Tokens.68 This was sufficient to satisfy the “investment of money” require-
ment because “money” does not need to take the form of cash.69 
The second and third elements of the Howey test require that investors put 
their money into a “common enterprise” and that they do so reasonably ex-
pecting profits.70 The DAO Report analyzed these two elements of the Howey 
test together to determine that investments in the DAO token did, in fact, in-
vest in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits.71 Some 
promotional materials disseminated by the DAO told investors that the pro-
gram “was a for-profit entity whose objective was to fund projects in exchange 
for a return on investment.”72 The ETH paid by investors in exchange for the 
 
 61 SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, Release No. 81207, REP. OF THE INVESTIGATION 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SEC. EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO (July 25, 
2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf (explaining that DAO is 
a broad term used to describe a virtual organization comprised of computer code whose 
transactions are executed over a blockchain) [hereinafter DAO Report]. 
 62 Id. at 1. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 2. 
 65 Id. 
 66 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (defining a security as partially 
the “investment of money . . . .”). 
 67 DAO Report, supra note 61, at 11. 
 68 Id. at 2–3, 11. 
 69 Id. (citing Uselton v. Comm. Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574 (10th 
Cir. 1991) (“[I]n spite of Howey’s reference to an ‘investment of money,’ it is well estab-
lished that cash is not the only form of contribution or investment that will create an in-
vestment contract.”). 
 70 Howey, 328 U.S. at 298–99. 
 71 DAO Report, supra note 61, at 11. 
 72 Id. at 11–12 (emphasis added). 
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DAO Tokens were “pooled and available to the DAO to fund projects.”73 The 
DAO Token holders could share in any profits from the projects executed by 
the pooled funds. The SEC determined this meant “a reasonable investor 
would have been motivated, at least in part, by the prospect of profits on their 
investment of ETH in The DAO.”74 
The fourth and final element of the Howey test is that the profit is “derived 
from the managerial efforts of others.”75 The SEC determined that the DAO 
also met this element.76 This element requires that the efforts made by others 
are significant in that they are the managerial efforts which affect the failure 
or success of the enterprise.77 “The investors’ profits were to be derived from 
the managerial efforts” of the company’s co-founders.78 Even though the in-
vestors were awarded voting rights, the SEC nevertheless concluded that the 
managerial efforts of others ultimately determined the success of the enter-
prise.79 The voting power awarded to the investors was limited, so the inves-
tors were still substantially reliant on others for their profits.80 
 
E. SEC Response 
 
Other than the DAO Report, the SEC has taken more measures to be pro-
active with the rise in technology and the emerging cryptocurrency market.81 
In 2017, music producer DJ Khaled and boxer Floyd Mayweather caught the 
SEC’s attention.82 Both celebrities promoted Centra Tech’s ICO on their so-
cial media accounts.83 The SEC separately charged Centra Tech with perform-
ing a fraudulent ICO.84 Khaled and Mayweather failed to disclose that they 
had been paid $50,000 and $100,000, respectively, by Centra Tech to promote 
the allegedly fraudulent ICO.85  The SEC has since warned consumers to be 
 
 73 Id. at 12. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 13. 
 80 Id. at 13–14. 
 81 Oversight of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (May 
16, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-oversight-secs-division-enforc 
ement (referring to multiple instances where the SEC Division of Enforcement helped in-
vestors by taking measures to prevent or restrain fraudulent ICOs). 
 82 Two Celebrities Charged with Unlawfully Touting Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-268. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
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especially cautious with ICOs that are endorsed by celebrities.86 In this spe-
cific case, the SEC is concerned that the celebrities’ failure to disclose the 
payments would make the endorsements appear to be unbiased, rather than a 
paid endorsement.87 Although both Khaled and Mayweather have settled with 
the SEC, this investigation illustrates that the SEC is taking these potentially 
fraudulent ICOs very seriously.88 The charges against Khaled and May-
weather were the first charges brought by the SEC against individuals for pro-
moting ICOs.89 
Additionally, a new unit within the Division of Enforcement, the Cyber 
Unit, has taken action to address ICOs and cryptocurrencies since the publi-
cation of the DAO Report.90 For instance, the SEC issued a statement saying, 
“[w]hen market participants engage in fraud under the guise of offering digital 
instruments—whether characterized as virtual currencies, coins, tokens, or the 
like—the SEC . . . will look beyond form, examine the substance of the activ-
ity and prosecute violations of the federal securities . . . laws.”91 The Cyber 
Unit has also brought a number of enforcement actions relating to ICOs.92 One 
enforcement action was halting an ICO which was selling digital tokens to its 
investors to raise capital for projects using blockchain to provide a food re-
view service.93 The SEC contacted the company to inform them that their con-
duct constituted unregistered securities offers and sales.94 The company sub-
sequently halted its ICO and refunded its investors all proceeds raised before 
any tokens were offered.95 The SEC intervened because over the course of the 
offering, promoters emphasized that the investors could expect efforts of the 
company to lead to a value increase in their tokens.96 
 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 81. 
 91 Joint Statement by SEC and CFTC Enforcement Directors Regarding Virtual Cur-
rency Enforcement Actions, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.sec.g 
ov/news/public-statement/joint-statement-sec-and-cftc-enforcement-directors. 
 92 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 81. 
 93 Company Halts ICO After SEC Raises Registration Concerns, 2012-227, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-227. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id.; see also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (this promotional promise, 
coupled with the investors putting in money to the common enterprise of the company, 
satisfies the four elements of the Howey test, thus enabling the SEC to step in and issue a 
cease and desist.). 
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III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW  
As a general principle, legislation of Congress is meant only to apply 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, absent a contrary intent 
by Congress.97 Thus, unless there is an affirmative intention of Congress 
clearly expressed giving a statute extraterritorial effect, courts presume it is 
primarily concerned with domestic conditions.98 Simply put, when a statute 
does not give a clear indication of an extraterritorial application, there is a 
presumption excluding any extraterritoriality.99 
 
A. The Securities and Exchange Acts 
 
The Securities and Exchange Acts contain antifraud provisions which can 
be utilized by the SEC to bring enforcement actions and by plaintiffs to bring 
a private right of action when they have been harmed by fraudulent securities 
transactions.100 The Securities Act and Exchange Acts were passed in re-
sponse to the stock market crash in 1929, which was widely believed to be 
caused by fraudulent securities activities.101 As such, the antifraud provisions 
supplied by both the Securities Act and Exchange Act are written liberally in 
attempt to protect investors.102 Section 11 of the Securities Act allows for lia-
bility when a registration statement contains “an untrue statement of material 
fact or omit[s] to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary 
to make the statements therein not misleading . . . .”103 Section 12(a)(2) of the 
Securities Act, on the other hand, creates civil liability for material omissions 
or misstatements in securities offerings and sales made by “means of a pro-
spectus or oral communication.”104 
The Exchange Act also contains antifraud provisions. These antifraud pro-
visions focus more on the conduct in the markets, as opposed to the Securities 
Act’s antifraud focus on preventing fraud within the registration and disclo-
sure process.105 An antifraud provision from the Exchange Act brings an 
 
 97 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Joshua L. Boehm, Private Securities Fraud Litigation After Morrison v. National 
Austl. Bank: Reconsidering a Reliance-Based Approach to Extraterritoriality, 53 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 249, 252 (2012). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §77k(a) (2012). 
 104 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §77l(a)(2) (2012). 
 105 Boehm, supra note 100. 
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overwhelming majority of securities fraud cases: §10(b) of the Exchange Act 
and its implementing regulation, Rule 10b-5.106 
 
B. §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
 
Since the vast majority of securities fraud class actions are brought as Rule 
10b-5 complaints,107 this note will focus on the 10b-5 fraud cause of action 
and its extraterritorial reach to the cryptocurrency market. Before explaining 
the law’s extraterritorial application, one must understand that law. Rule 10b-
5 antifraud liability mirrors the common law fraud claim. To establish a 10b-
5 cause of action, a plaintiff must prove that there was either a material mis-
statement or omission, scienter, reliance, causation, and harm.108 
Rule 10b-5 is widely regarded as a catch-all provision to deter fraudulent 
activity in the capital markets.109 It might seem strange that Rule 10b-5 is con-
sidered the catch-all antifraud provision because it requires plaintiffs to carry 
a higher burden of proving that the defendant acted with scienter.110 Never-
theless, Rule 10b-5 allows more claims than other antifraud securities laws 
because the rule has fewer restrictions than other antifraud provisions.111 
 
 106 Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Rela-
tionship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUMB. L. REV. 
1301, 1302 (2008). 
 107 Id. 
 108 See Section 10(b) Litigation: The Current Landscape, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N (June 
29, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2014/10/03 
_kasner/ (explaining that “[t]o establish liability under §10(b), a plaintiff must show that: 
[t]he defendant made a material misstatement or omission; [t]he misstatement or omission 
was made . . . with scienter; [t]here is a connection between the misrepresentation or omis-
sion and the plaintiff’s purchase or sale of a security; [t]he plaintiff relied on the misstate-
ment or omission; [t]he plaintiff suffered economic loss; and [t]here is a causal connection 
between the material misrepresentation or omission and the plaintiff’s loss.”). 
 109 See e.g., Douglas C. Conroy, Michael L. Zuppone & David J. Kaplan, SEC Anti-Fraud 
Rule 10b-5 Broadly Construed by Supreme Court, PAUL HASTINGS (July 1, 2002), 
https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=36adde69-2334-6428-811c- 
ff00004cbded (referring to SEC’s Rule 10b-5 as a “catch-all” antifraud provision). 
 110 See Section 10(b) Litigation: The Current Landscape, supra note 108 (listing that a 
misstatement or omission be made with scienter as one of the elements of a 10b-5 claim). 
 111 Compare Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5 (2018), with Civil Liabilities on Account of False Registrations Statement, 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 77k (effective Nov. 3, 1998) (providing antifraud liability only for material omissions or 
misstatements made in the registration statement which means that a plaintiff cannot bring 
a §11 claim for any fraudulent activity that arises outside the context of the registration 
statement and restricts the defendants of a §11 claim to an enumerated list) and Civil Lia-
bilities Arising in Connection with Prospectuses and Communication, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k 
(2018) (providing antifraud protection to limited class of plaintiffs that only include those 
who purchased or sold securities against a limited class of defendants) and 15 U.S.C.A. § 
12(a)(2) (limiting the its scope to misstatement or omissions only in the prospectus or oral 
communication). 
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There is no private cause of action explicitly sanctioned in §10(b) or Rule 
10b-5.112 However, the federal courts have recognized an implied private 
cause of action for securities fraud in Rule 10b-5.113 Justice Rehnquist referred 
to the implied private right of action as a “judicial oak which has grown from 
little more than a legislative acorn.”114 This sentiment reflects the expansive 
liability that the private cause of action created by Rule 10b-5. 
The private right of action under 10b-5 is an important antifraud mecha-
nism. The SEC has limited resources and believes that private rights of actions 
are a necessary supplement to their own efforts to prevent fraud.115 The private 
right of action provides additional deterrence from fraud,116 so this system 
could be a helpful mechanism to keep cryptocurrency markets free from fraud. 
As discussed below, it is more difficult for plaintiffs bringing a private right 
of action under 10b-5 to show that extraterritorial application is appropriate 
than for the SEC bringing an enforcement action. This note will discuss both 
the SEC’s ability to bring a 10b-5 action with extraterritorial implications and 
the same for a private right of action. It is necessary to examine both SEC 
action and private action because of the importance of the private right of ac-
tion in supplementing the SEC’s ability to police the market. 
 
C. The Courts’ Interpretation of the Laws’ Extraterritorial Application 
 
The Supreme Court addressed the extraterritorial reach of the United 
States’ securities regulation regime, specifically section 10b and Rule 10b-5, 
in Morrison v. National Australia Bank in 2010.117 National Australia Bank 
used HomeSide, a mortgage servicer based in the United States.118 For years, 
HomeSide’s executives manipulated their financial models to make their 
mortgage servicing rights seem more valuable.119 They would submit the 
fraudulent information to National Australia Bank, which would in turn inflate 
National Australia Bank’s annual reports.120 National Australia Bank’s exec-
utives were aware of HomeSide’s fraud and that their own statements were 
inflated as a result, but they nevertheless included the false information in 
 
 112 See Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(2018) (omitting an explicit private right of action). 
 113 See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1917) (“[I]t 
was held in 1946 . . . that there was an implied private right of action under [Rule 10b-
5].”). 
 114 Id. at 737. 
 115 CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 9. 
 116 Id. 
 117 See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 118 Boehm, supra note 100, at 257. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
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their own reports.121 Further, National Australia Bank’s executives praised 
HomeSide’s success in public statements.122 National Australia Bank eventu-
ally announced the write-downs relating to HomeSide in 2001, equating to 
roughly two billion U.S. dollars.123 As a result, numerous Australian share-
holders who had purchased National Australia Bank stock in Australia filed 
suit in America.124   
Prior to Morrison, the Second Circuit developed two doctrines to deter-
mine whether courts had jurisdiction to hear section 10(b) claims: the “con-
ducts” test and the “effects” test.125 Morrison was brought to the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals on a “conducts” test theory of subject matter 
jurisdiction.126 The conducts test focuses on the underlying activity causing 
fraud, as opposed to the effects test’s approach of focusing on the fraud af-
fecting U.S. investors and markets.127 The Second Circuit determined that the 
critical factor of the conduct test is that “significant conduct” in furtherance 
of the fraud occurred in the United States.128 Under the conducts test, it did 
not necessarily matter whether U.S. shareholders or foreign shareholders ulti-
mately endured the loss caused by the fraud.129 Judge Henry Friendly, when 
assessing the rationale of the conduct test, reasoned that Congress certainly 
wanted to avoid the United States “[becoming] used as a base for manufactur-
ing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are peddled only 
to foreigners.”130 In Morrison, the Second Circuit used the conducts test to 
conclude that the U.S.-based conduct was not “at the heart of the fraud” and 
therefore insufficient to support jurisdiction.131 While HomeSide ran its oper-
ations in the United States, it was National Australia Bank’s Australian-based 
executives’ responsibility to report correct information to its shareholders.132 
In the appellate court’s view, it was the Australian executives’ oversight, not 
the manipulation of numbers in the United States, that was central to the fraud 
that harmed investors.133 
 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 253–54. 
 126 Id. at 257. 
 127 Id. at 254. 
 128 Id. at 255. 
 129 Id. 
 130 IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975) (addressing whether foreign 
investors had subject matter jurisdiction under federal securities laws by defrauded foreign 
individuals where the U.S. was used to manufacture the “fraudulent security devices”), 
abrogated by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 131 Boehm, supra note 100, at 258. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
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These tests were rejected and deemed irrelevant to the extraterritorial ap-
plication of U.S. securities laws in the cryptocurrency context when the Su-
preme Court, in Morrison, disagreed with Second Circuit’s analysis.134 The 
Court noted that the “Second Circuit never put forward a textual or even ex-
tratextual basis” for the conducts and effects tests.135 Justice Scalia, writing 
for the majority, disagreed with the Second Circuit on whether this was a 
question of subject matter jurisdiction.136 Instead, he said that §10(b)’s extra-
territorial reach was a question of merit.137 This conclusion flowed from the 
canon, discussed above, which presumes, absent a clear intent of Congress, a 
lack of extraterritorial application of a statute.138 
The Morrison holding was that §10(b) only applies to transactions in se-
curities listed on domestic exchanges and domestic transactions in other secu-
rities.139 The holding in Morrison is an important step in understanding the 
development of the law concerning the extraterritorial application of antifraud 
provisions in U.S. securities laws in response to fraud in cryptocurrency mar-
kets. According to the Court, U.S. securities laws focus on the purchase and 
sale of securities in the U.S., not on the place of deception.140 The Court es-
sentially replaced the conducts and effects test with a new transactional test.141 
This new test only allows a private right of action to foreign plaintiffs for 
§10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in two situations.142 The transactions giving rise to the 
claim must have either (1) occurred in the United States or (2) involved a 
security listed on a U.S. exchange.143 
 
D. Congress Passes Dodd-Frank 
 
Just days after the Supreme Court issued the Morrison opinion,144 Con-
gress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (Dodd-Frank).145 Two provisions of Dodd-Frank were in direct response 
 
 134 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 247–48 (2010). 
 135 Id. at 258. 
 136 Boehm, supra note 100, at 258. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 259. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Andrew Rocks, Whoops! The Imminent Reconciliation of U.S. Securities Laws with 
International Comity After Morrison v. National Austl. Bank and the Drafting Error in the 
Dodd-Frank Act, 56 VILL. L. REV. 163, 165 (2011). 
 142 Id. 
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 144 Id. at 188. 
 145 Meny Elgadeh, Morrison v. National Austl. Bank: Life After Dodd-Frank, 16 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 573, 591–92 (2011). 
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to the Court’s Morrison holding.146 Sections 929p and 929y of Dodd-Frank 
are the relevant provisions.147 Dodd-Frank §929p provides extraterritorial ju-
risdiction of securities laws for violations involving “(1) conduct within the 
United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, 
even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves 
only foreign investors,” or “(2) conduct occurring outside the United States 
that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.”148 This pro-
vision of Dodd-Frank essentially codifies the “conducts” and “effects” tests149 
that the Second Circuit relied upon before the Supreme Court in Morrison 
rejected the tests.150 Dodd-Frank §929y, however, only authorizes extraterri-
torial jurisdiction for actions brought “by the Commission or the United 
States,” excluding private actions from the legislative reinstatement of the 
conducts and effects test in §929p.151 
These provisions of Dodd-Frank seem to fail at capturing Congress’s in-
tent.152 When Representative Paul Kanjorski, a leader in the drafting of Dodd-
Frank, debated the law on the House floor, he asserted that the object of §929p 
is to rebut the presumption against extraterritorial application.153 This intent 
seems unfulfilled when compared to the pre-Dodd-Frank Morrison deci-
sion.154 The Morrison decision clarified that there is no jurisdictional limit on 
the extraterritorial application of §10(b).155 Instead, the restriction on the use 
of U.S. tribunals stems from the meaning of the statute, which is interpreted 
with a presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law.156 Section 
929p does not directly address the Court’s holding,157 but instead addresses 
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in actions brought by the SEC. This does not 
include whether the securities laws can be applied extraterritorially.158 
 
 
 146 Id. at 592 (explaining that Dodd-Frank addressed numerous financial regulatory con-
cerns, but that two provisions of Dodd-Frank were directly related to the court’s Morrison 
holding). 
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 149 Boehm, supra note 100, at 250. 
 150 Elgadeh, supra note 145, at 592. 
 151 Id. at 593. 
 152 Rocks, supra note 141, at 188. 
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 154 See Clearly Gottlieb Steen, District Judge Rules That Dodd-Frank Allows SEC to 
Bring Securities Fraud Claims Over Certain Foreign Transactions, U. OXFORD FAC. L. 
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E. Uncertainty About the Impact of Dodd-Frank on SEC Enforcement 
Actions 
 
Courts have interpreted the effect of Dodd-Frank §929p’s conduct and ef-
fects test on the Morrison holding issuing the transactional test differently.159 
In SEC v. Chicago Convention Center, the Tenth Circuit addressed how 
Dodd-Frank and the Morrison decision interacted with each other.160 In this 
case, the SEC alleged that the defendants fraudulently sold millions of dollars’ 
worth of securities to over 250 Chinese nationals investors who hoped to ob-
tain U.S. citizenship through their investment.161 The investors were allegedly 
lured into making investments because of the E13-5 Program created under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990.162 This program allowed foreign 
nationals to qualify for a green card “if the individuals invest $1,000,000 . . . 
creating or preserving at least 10 jobs for U.S. workers.”163 The SEC brought 
the suit and sought injunctive relief.164 
The defendants argued that the Morrison decision applied to the case and 
that it should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.165 The defendants as-
serted that under the transactional test put forth in Morrison, the SEC is unable 
to assert a claim against them because the transactions at issue were not do-
mestic transactions.166 The SEC argued Dodd-Frank revived the conducts and 
effects test for SEC actions, superseding Morrison.167 The court recognized 
that the interaction of these two standards create a “complex interpretation 
issue,”168 but ultimately did not come to a conclusion on that interpretation 
issue.169 Under any of the tests, the SEC stated a claim. The motion to dismiss 
was denied without reaching the issue of whether Dodd-Frank superseded 
Morrison for claims brought by the SEC.170 
 
 159 Compare SEC v. Chi. Convention Ctr., LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 905, 909–917 (N.D. Ill. 
2013) (suggesting that Dodd-Frank may not have successfully amended the securities 
laws), with SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1291–93 (D. Utah 2017) 
(finding clear indication of congressional intent to codify the conducts and effects test). 
 160 See SEC v. Chi. Convention Ctr., 961 F. Supp. 2d at 909–17 (explaining how to in-
terpret Dodd-Frank §929p(b) in light of the Morrison decision being issued just a few days 
prior to its passage). 
 161 Id. at 907. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 908. 
 165 SEC v. Chi. Convention Ctr., LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 905, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 916. 
 169 Id. at 908. 
 170 See SEC v. Chi. Convention Ctr., LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 905, 917–918 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
580 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 48:563 
A federal judge did eventually decide how the passage of Dodd-Frank af-
fected the Supreme Court’s holding in Morrison for actions brought by the 
SEC.171 Judge Parrish’s decision in Traffic Monsoon was the first federal rul-
ing deciding this issue. The SEC brought an action against Traffic Monsoon, 
an internet advertising company, in which the SEC alleged that the company 
was involved in an illegal Ponzi scheme.172 The SEC alleged that Traffic Mon-
soon’s activity was in violation of §10(b) of the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5, 
and §17(a) of the Securities Act. 173 
Traffic Monsoon used Morrison’s transactional test to argue that the SEC 
did not have authority to regulate its transactions.174 Traffic Monsoon argued 
that since 90% of customers purchased its securities over the internet and the 
customers were located outside of the U.S. when they made the purchases, 
these transactions were primarily foreign and not within the SEC’s reach.175 
The SEC argued that Dodd-Frank applied the conducts and effects test to all 
similar cases.176 The SEC asserted that the language and history of Dodd-
Frank demonstrate that Congress intended to reinstate this test for actions 
brought by the SEC regarding transnational securities fraud.177 Under the con-
duct and effects test, the SEC could bring a claim against Traffic Monsoon 
because Traffic Monsoon’s conduct of creating, marketing, selling, and man-
aging its investment scheme did occur within the U.S.178 
The court agreed with the SEC and held that Dodd-Frank superseded Mor-
rison for actions brought by the SEC. Dodd-Frank sufficiently rebutted the 
general judicial presumption against extraterritoriality for enforcement ac-
tions brought by the SEC under §10(b) of the Exchange Act and §17(a) of the 
Securities Act.179 
The court noted that §929p(b) was drafted prior to Morrison, at a time in 
which circuit courts widely applied the conduct and effects test.180 In a context 
where the Supreme Court had not yet issued its Morrison decision, the court 
reasoned that Dodd-Frank simply codified the already-prevailing standard.181 
The last meeting to reconcile the House and Senate bills occurred on the day 
the Supreme Court issued Morrison.182 As such, the court stated that “[i]t 
strains credulity” to assume that legislators considered the Court’s decision 
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when finalizing Dodd-Frank.183 Judge Parrish concluded, “[t]o conform Sec-
tion 929P(b) to the Morrison opinion at the last minute would be like requiring 
a steaming battleship to turn on a dime to retrieve a lifejacket that fell over-
board,” and “[t]hus the court does not presume that Congress intended Section 
929P(b) to be a nullity.”184 
The court in Traffic Monsoon noted that legislators who worked on the bill 
explicitly expressed their understanding that Dodd-Frank codified the conduct 
and effects test.185 Further, the court reasoned that the assumption that Con-
gress intended the amendment “to be mere surplusage, with no discernable 
effect, flies in the face of reason” because §929P(b) would be a nullity if Mor-
rison applied to SEC actions under §§10(b) and 17(a).186 The court explained, 
“[i]t would be pointless to clarify that district courts had jurisdiction to hear 
Section 10(b) and 17(a) claims based on certain extraterritorial transactions 
unless Congress also intended that these statutes be applied extraterritori-
ally.”187 
Though the effect of Dodd-Frank on the Morrison decision in terms of the 
extraterritoriality of §10(b) in SEC enforcement actions is uncertain,188 this 
Note follows the Traffic Monsoon interpretation of the issue. This leads to the 
assumption that Dodd-Frank supersedes the Morrison decision for SEC en-
forcement actions.189 Accordingly, the SEC can use U.S. tribunals to bring 
actions against foreign transactions when those transactions meet the conducts 
and effects test.190 
The conducts and effects test under Dodd-Frank gives the SEC a broader 
ability to bring enforcement actions against unregistered ICOs abroad than an 
individual has under Morrison’s transactional test. The language of Dodd-
Frank §929p allows the SEC to bring an action against foreign conduct so 
long as the transactions meet either the conducts test or the effects test.191 The 
conducts test focuses “on the nature of [the] conduct within the United States 
as it relates to carrying out the alleged fraudulent scheme.”192 The rationale 
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behind this test is to ensure that the United States does not become a base for 
fraudulent activity, harming foreign investors.193 
There is a broad range of what level of domestic conduct is sufficient to 
satisfy the conducts test. Some circuits require that the domestic conduct in 
itself constitutes a violation of U.S. securities laws.194 Other courts, however, 
require only some activity that is significant to the furtherance of the fraudu-
lent scheme within the United States in order to satisfy the conducts test.195 
These two approaches represent extreme ends of the spectrum,196 but many 
courts fall in between these two approaches.197 These courts generally find 
that when some activity within the United States was significant to the 
scheme, the conducts test is satisfied.198 
Even if the conducts test is not satisfied, the SEC can still bring an action 
if it satisfies the effects test. The effects test is satisfied when conduct occur-
ring in foreign countries “cause[s] foreseeable and substantial harm to inter-
ests in the United States.”199 The rationale behind the effects test comes from 
the principle that acts done outside of a jurisdiction but nevertheless intend to 
produce, threaten to produce, or foreseeably do produce harmful effects 
within that jurisdiction, justify punishment of the offender by that jurisdiction 
as if the actor had performed the activity within its borders.200 Under the 
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effects test, the SEC could bring an action when American investors, securi-
ties traded on a U.S. exchange or issued by a U.S. entity, or U.S. domestic 
markets are harmed.201 
It is easier for the SEC to bring enforcement actions by satisfying the con-
ducts and effects test rather than Morrison’s transactional test. In fact, the SEC 
has already halted a foreign ICO and brought a Rule 10b-5 claim against the 
company with no issues surrounding extraterritoriality. However, the private 
right of action is an important enforcement tool of U.S. securities regula-
tion.202 The SEC has limited resources to bring their enforcement actions. The 
next section will therefore examine the private cause of action for extraterri-
torial Rule 10b-5 claims relating to cryptocurrency transactions. 
IV. PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION 
A. Morrison Transactional Test in Private Causes of Action 
 
The Morrison transactional test still applies to private causes of action 
when litigants claim a violation of §10(b). The Dodd-Frank §929p codifica-
tion of the conducts and effects test only applies to actions brought by the SEC 
or Department of Justice.203 In order to determine how a foreign investor can 
bring a private action for fraudulent cryptocurrency actions, it is important to 
look to how the test has been applied in U.S. courts. 
The transactional test put forth in Morrison has two prongs, only one of 
which must be met to create jurisdiction.204 The fraudulent security must be 
either (i) connected with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an Amer-
ican stock exchange, or (ii) purchased in the United States.205 It seems unlikely 
that ICOs will satisfy the first prong of the transactional test because they are 
not listed on formal exchange platforms such as the New York Stock Ex-
change. Therefore, this Note will focus on the second prong of the 
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transactional test: that the security must have been purchased within the 
United States.206 
Many scholars recognize that determining what constitutes a domestic 
transaction under the second prong of Morrison’s transactional test is one of 
the most difficult issues the courts dealt with in the years following the Mor-
rison decision.207 The difficulty stemmed from the Supreme Court’s silence 
as to when a transaction occurs “in the United States” when the security was 
not listed on a U.S. exchange.208 Courts set forth competing approaches to 
determine when an off-exchange transaction occurs in the United States.209 
Some courts presupposed that securities transactions can take place across 
multiple jurisdictions.210 Under this approach, courts examine the entire trans-
action and “determine if any of the critical steps occurred” in the United 
States.211 Other courts examined the transaction closely to determine precisely 
when, in the course of the purchase or sale, “the parties incurred ‘irrevocable 
liability’ to complete the transaction.”212 If the moment of irrevocable liability 
occurred in the United States, then the investor could bring a private cause of 
action under §10(b).213 If the moment of irrevocable liability occurred outside 
of the United States, a §10(b) private cause of action would not be available 
to investors.214 
 
B. Tezos Decision 
 
The issue of extraterritorial application of securities laws on cryptocur-
rency transactions came up in August 2018, when a U.S. District Court heard 
a class action case in which a group of investors attempted “to hold a crypto-
currency enterprise liable for violations of federal securities law.”215 The 
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complaint was brought against a number of defendants.216 A few located in 
California were Arthur and Kathleen Breitman and their company, Dynamic 
Ledger solutions.217 The Tezos Foundation, a nonprofit established by the 
Breitmans based in Switzerland, was used to oversee the ICO at issue and was 
another defendant.218 The final defendant was Bitcoin Suisse, a foreign firm 
specializing in the crypto-financial sector which provided intermediary ser-
vices to some ICO contributors.219 
Unsurprisingly, this issue of extraterritoriality did not apply to the defend-
ants located in California, since they clearly subjected themselves to United 
States’ laws by being physically present within its borders.220 The court first 
addressed Bitcoin Suisse’s role as a defendant.221 The court determined that it 
did not have specific jurisdiction over Bitcoin Suisse.222 The intermediary did 
not provide services for the Tezos ICO to any U.S. investor.223 This under-
mines the plaintiffs’ ability to prove that the defendant committed an inten-
tional act expressly aimed at the forum state, causing harm which the defend-
ant knew was likely to be suffered in the forum state.224 Accordingly, the 
claim against Bitcoin Suisse was dismissed.225 
The court next addressed its jurisdictional reach over the Tezos Founda-
tion.226 Tezos’s website was freely accessible to U.S. citizens, was hosted on 
an Arizona server, and was highly interactive.227 All of these factors were suf-
ficient to establish personal jurisdiction under the relevant standard.228 As 
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such, the claim was not dismissed and the court was able to address the issue 
of extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws as applied to an ICO. 
Since this ICO was not listed on a domestic exchange, the second prong of 
Morrison is the relevant inquiry. The defendants argued that the second prong 
of Morrison requires that the transaction itself be domestic.229 The defendants 
argued that the transactions took place outside of the United States and it 
would therefore be inappropriate to apply U.S. securities laws to the transac-
tions.230 The Tezos Foundation argued that their transactions occurred in Al-
derney, a British territory, because that was “the legal site of all ICO transac-
tions” according to the forum selection clause in the contracts.231 The 
defendants reasoned that the “contractual situs” of the transaction was foreign, 
so the purchase and sale occurred outside of the U.S.232 The defendants also 
argued that the location of their website was not as important as the location 
of the foundation’s “contribution software.”233 
The court rejected Tezos’s argument and found that the relevant inquiry is 
where the actual situs of buying an unregistered security online and recorded 
on the blockchain took place.234 In Tezos’s case, the actual situs occured 
within the United States.235 The defendant used an interactive website that was 
hosted on a server in Arizona and run primarily by someone in California.236 
The plaintiff learned about the ICO from marketing almost exclusively target-
ing United States residents.237 Lastly, the plaintiff’s contribution to the ICO 
became irrevocable only once it was validated by a network of “nodes” which 
were clustered more densely in the United States than anywhere else in the 
world.238 Taking all of these factors into account, the court determined this 
was a domestic transaction and thus satisfied the second prong of Morrison.239 
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V. ANALYSIS 
If the Supreme Court were to hear an appeal of Tezos, they would likely 
affirm and hold that Morrison was correctly applied in the cryptocurrency 
context. The test adopted by the court in Morrison is relatively simple. Private 
rights of action for Rule 10b-5 have extraterritorial application only when the 
use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with 
the purchase or sale with either a security listed on an American stock ex-
change or any other security in the United States.240 
Cryptocurrencies generally are not traded on U.S. exchanges,241 but the 
New York Stock Exchange has announced that it will become a platform for 
cryptocurrencies.242 The exchange will create a company called Bakkt, which 
will manage investors’ cryptocurrencies,243 starting with Bitcoin exclu-
sively.244 Since Bitcoin is relatively established for a form of cryptocur-
rency,245 there is less of a fear of fraud relating to its trading. This means that 
for purposes of 10b-5 claims, it is unlikely that investors will claim extrater-
ritorial application based on the “purchase or sale of a security listed on an 
American stock exchange” prong of the Morrison test. 
Eliminating this prong means that most claims will be brought by alleging 
that the purchase or sale of the security at issue occurred in the United States. 
This is what the Tezos court held.246 As mentioned above, the Tezos court 
determined that this fraudulent ICO did occur “in the United States” for vari-
ous reasons.247 The “actual situs” of purchasing the unregistered securities oc-
curred within the United States.248 The website used to sell the unregistered 
securities was hosted on a server within the United States, the website was 
controlled by a U.S. resident, and the transaction become irrevocable when it 
was validated by a network of nodes that were clustered most densely in the 
United States.249 The court determined all of these factors taken together lead 
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to the conclusion that the transaction occurred in the United States.250 The 
most important factor was arguably the dense cluster of nodes within the 
United States.251 
Is this holding consistent with how the second prong of Morrison has been 
interpreted outside the context of cryptocurrencies? Courts typically use two 
approaches to interpret the second prong of Morrison: one is to examine 
whether any of the critical steps of the transaction occurred domestically and 
the other is to examine where the parties incurred “irrevocable liability” that 
completed the transaction.252 The Tezos decision is consistent with both ap-
proaches. 
The “critical step” approach applies to the Tezos decision because the court 
recognized that a contributing factor to the domestic treatment of the transac-
tion was the fact that the cluster of nodes validating the transaction were most 
densely present in the United States.253 These nodes are a critical step in the 
entire transaction that did occur domestically. Without the nodes, the transac-
tion could not have taken place. Even if the nodes did not satisfy the “critical 
step” test, the domestic website would satisfy the critical step approach as 
well. The website was the sole means through which investors were able to 
purchase securities, and therefore critical to the process as a whole.254 
The “irrevocable liability” approach is also consistent with the Tezos de-
cision because the moment the transaction became final and the purchaser in-
curred irrevocable liability was when the network of nodes validated the trans-
action.255 The nodes were most densely clustered in the United States,256 
which means the irrevocable liability must have occurred in the United States. 
Some may argue that the Tezos decision was decided wrongly because it 
applied Morrison’s transaction test incorrectly. One argument against the Te-
zos opinion is that the cluster of nodes was not enough to consider the trans-
action “in the United States.”257 This counterargument has some validity—the 
Tezos transaction did have other critical steps that occurred outside of the 
United States, such as the legal site of the seller in Switzerland.258 The Tezos 
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defendant also made the convincing argument of the “‘bedrock principle’ 
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law.”259 Nevertheless, the majority 
rightfully rejected these arguments.260 While it is true that there is a bedrock 
principle against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, the SEC also has a 
bedrock principle of protecting U.S. investors.261 The Tezos defendants threat-
ened the protection of U.S. investors by targeting U.S. residents in the promo-
tion of their ICO.262 
Since the Tezos decision is consistent with the past interpretation of the 
Morrison decision, the court’s interpretation of extraterritorial application of 
§10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as applied to cryptocurrency has a sufficient legal ba-
sis. In future cases similar to Tezos, courts will have to look at numerous fac-
tors to determine if the transaction occurred in the United States. The Tezos 
court examined the location of the server which hosted the securities sales 
website, the residency of the website controller, and the means by which the 
transaction becomes irrevocable.263 Courts will look to this non-exclusive list 
of factors to find evidence about where the actual situs of buying unregistered 
securities occurred. 
Based on the Tezos decision, it is possible that foreign investors will be 
able to bring Rule 10b-5 claims in the United States for certain ICOs as long 
as the plaintiff can show that the actual situs of the transaction occurred in the 
United States. If the ICO is truly global in nature and not intentionally avoid-
ing the United States, the investor will likely be able to carry the burden of 
showing the transaction was in the United States. If the sales website has sub-
stantial ties to the United States, like the website in Tezos, the plaintiffs will 
be able to find relief in U.S. courts. However, the Court likely did not con-
template that the transactional test would be applied to the cryptocurrency 
market one day when it made the Morrison decision in 2010. The growing 
cryptocurrency market is much different than the traditional securities markets 
that our case law contemplates. The SEC or Congress should provide guid-
ance on how to regulate the cryptocurrency market with securities laws in-
stead of our judiciary applying tests created for different contexts. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Since the SEC has declared that some ICOs are within the purview of fed-
eral securities regulation, there has been a reexamination of various doctrines 
and their applicability to the emerging cryptocurrency market. The doctrine 
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of extraterritoriality has quickly become an unresolved issue within the fed-
eral regulation of cryptocurrency through securities laws. 
The Supreme Court decided Morrison in 2010, which addressed extrater-
ritorial application of Rule 10b-5 generally. Just days later, Congress super-
seded the Court’s Morrison decision for SEC enforcement actions by passing 
Dodd-Frank. As such, the SEC can bring actions under the conducts and ef-
fects test, including actions against foreign cryptocurrency fraud if there is 
sufficient conduct within the United States. The SEC has already been able to 
bring enforcement actions against foreign fraudulent ICOs under these tests. 
However, the private right of action is also an important enforcement tool 
for U.S. securities regulation. The harsher transactional test adopted in Mor-
rison still applies to the private cause of action. An individual can bring a 10b-
5 claim against a foreign issuer if the security was either traded on a U.S. 
exchange or the transaction occurred in the United States. Cryptocurrencies 
are not traded on any U.S. exchange yet, so cryptocurrency transactions will 
have to be “in the United States” for an individual to bring a Rule 10b-5 claim. 
In August, a U.S. District Court applied the Morrison “in the United 
States” test to a cryptocurrency transaction.264 That court found that the trans-
action did occur in the United States because various factors evidenced that 
the actual situs of the transaction occurred in the United States.265 These fac-
tors included the location of the website on which transactions occurred on, 
the location of the person controlling the website, and the location of nodes 
that finalized the transaction.266 Based on previous interpretations of Morrison 
outside of the cryptocurrency context, the Tezos decision would likely be up-
held if it were appealed to the Supreme Court. 
However, in the wake of a brand-new form of currency, it is time for the 
SEC or Congress to formulate rules and regulations specifically addressing 
the complex issues arising in the emerging cryptocurrency market. 
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